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Successfully addressing patient safety requires detecting medical events eﬀectively. Given the volume of patients seen at medical
centers, detecting events automatically from data that are already available electronically would greatly facilitate patient safety work.
Wehave created a framework for electronic detection.Key steps include: selecting target events, assessingwhat information is available
electronically, transforming rawdata such as narrative notes into a coded format, querying the transformeddata, verifying the accuracy
of event detection, characterizing the events using systems and cognitive approaches, and using what is learned to improve detection.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The Institute of Medicines report on medical errors
demonstrates that adverse events in hospitalized patients
are common [1]. A study of 30,121 randomly selected
records of hospitalized patients admitted to acute-care
hospitals in New York State in 1984 [2] showed that
3.7% had adverse events; of those, 2.6% caused perma-
nent disability, 13.6% caused death, and 28% were
negligent. A second study of 15,000 discharges from
hospitals in Utah and Colorado in 1992 [3] showed that
2.9% had adverse events; of those, 2.2% caused perma-
nent disability, 6.6% caused death, and 27–32% were
negligent. Several studies have attempted to clarify the
epidemiology of adverse events [4,5].
As these studies suggest, there are many types of er-
rors that occur, some of which can lead to adverse
events and increased cost. Addressing these errors re-
quires understanding how and when they occur. In or-
der to implement error prevention goals, one must
evaluate the types of systems failures that occur in the
medical system under scrutiny. The ﬁrst and critical step* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-212-305-3302.
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doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2003.08.001in this process is identifying medical errors. As Zapt and
Reason point out, if an error is not detected, it cannot be
managed [6]. They assert that the error detection rate
must be high, for errors that are not detected for a long
time could have disastrous consequences. Yet error de-
tection rates are generally low. The New York State
Health Departments mandatory event reporting pro-
gram, for example, estimated that only 16% of code 605
(death within 48 h of an operating room procedure) are
being reported, and these should be among the easier
events to detect [7]. Furthermore, some hospitals were
reporting virtually no errors. Kaplan et al. [8] found
gross underreporting of errors in a transfusion service.
The importance of the large chart review studies [2,3] lies
in the fact that errors are grossly underreported. There
are a number of approaches to improving detection
rates, including no fault near miss reporting [8], stricter
mandated reporting with sanctions against low report-
ing [7], and meticulous chart review [2,3].
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to describe a framework
for an iterative approach to event discovery in electronic
medical records that is based upon a clinical data
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We summarize our deﬁnitions and assumptions and the
literature describing capture of medical errors, and we
discuss knowledge gaps and issues related to the
approach.
1.2. Deﬁnitions and assumptions
For this paper, we will adopt the following error-
related deﬁnitions. A medical error is deﬁned as the
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended
or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim [1]. An
adverse event is deﬁned as an injury caused by medical
management rather than by the underlying disease or
condition of the patient [1]. An adverse outcome is de-
ﬁned as an undesirable and unintended outcome of care
such as prolonged hospitalization, disability, or death at
the time of discharge [2]. A near miss (as deﬁned by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Qualitys Center
for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety) is an event
in which the unwanted consequences were prevented
because there was a recovery by identiﬁcation and
correction of the failure. The recovery might be planned
or unplanned. Therefore, the following situations are
possible:
• medical error accompanied by an adverse outcome
(e.g., a drug rash due to prescribing a medication to
which the patient is known to be allergic);
• near miss, which is a medical error from which there
has been a recovery (e.g., if the pharmacist catches a
prescription to a medication to which the patient is
known to be allergic);
• medical error without a recovery but without an ad-
verse outcome because of luck or the robustness of
human physiology (e.g., a medication to which the
patient is known to be allergic is prescribed, dis-
pensed, and taken, but the patient has no reaction);
• adverse outcome without an error (e.g., an allergic re-
action to a medication for which there was no known
allergy).
In this paper, we will use the term event to refer to any
medical error (with or without recovery or harm) or
adverse outcome. Event is therefore the broadest term
and includes all of the deﬁnitions above.
Our framework includes the following assumptions.
There exists a repository of rich clinical information that
we hypothesize contains useful data about patient safe-
ty. The data are obscured, however, due to the way they
are recorded. Much is in narrative form and therefore
not amenable to traditional statistical analysis, and even
when coded, the data are stored in complex, nested
structures that may be diﬃcult to use. A set of infor-
matics tools exists—natural language processing, ma-
chine learning, etc.—that are capable of extracting the
useful patient safety information from the repository in
an automated or partially automated fashion. Manualreview of the paper and electronic medical record (and
in a smaller sample, interviews of the relevant care
providers) can be used to create a reference standard to
judge the accuracy of the automated system. Errors have
structure that can be described using a systems approach
to errors and using a cognitive approach. We may then
use these descriptions to learn how to improve the au-
tomated system.2. Capture of medical events
Various methods have been used to capture medical
errors. While physician chart review of all cases is gen-
erally considered a gold standard, this is expensive. The
primary method has been to rely on self-reporting in
combination with non-physician screens to develop a
subset of cases where medical errors are more likely.
Several approaches have been taken to generate
screening criteria with better characteristics. Screening
using non-physician human review generally is accom-
plished by setting established screening criteria to ﬂag
cases where medical errors are more likely to occur. For
example, the Harvard Medical Practice Study [2] used 18
screening criteria and used medical analysts trained in
medical record coding, terminology, and management
[9].
Self-reporting systems are also widely used. ONeil
[10] studied 3141 patients using record review and an
aggressive physician self-reporting system found 133
cases where adverse events had occurred. The physician
self-reporting identiﬁed 89 while the chart review
methods identiﬁed 85. Unfortunately, other studies have
demonstrated that self-reporting systems also miss a
signiﬁcant portion of errors identiﬁed by though other
means, and their success has been limited to relatively
few settings where anonymity can be assured and daily
feedback on the importance of reporting is emphasized
[10,11].
Automated rule systems that ﬂag potential adverse
events have shown promise because they are relatively
inexpensive compared to manual review if the data are
collected for other purposes. They may detect errors
not recorded using other techniques and they can
identify errors retrospectively or prospectively with the
potential to facilitate prevention. Often this is dra-
matic. For example, at the LDS hospital in Utah,
Classen and his colleagues [10] demonstrated a 60-fold
increase in adverse drug event detection and subse-
quently a 65% reduction in severe adverse drug events
compared to historical controls [12]. Similarly, Jha
et al. [13] used a computer-based monitor to detect
adverse drug events and compared the result to other
methods. Evans et al. [14,15] used a computer-based
monitor to address hospital-acquired infections and
antibiotic use.
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lected by ONeil [10], Bates [16] estimated the proba-
bility of the event being detected or prevented by
computer systems with diﬀerent levels of sophistication.
He estimated that 53% of the cases could be identiﬁed
with demographic information, diagnostic test results,
and a list of current medications. Adding physician
order entry and problem lists raised the identiﬁcation
rate to 89%. Five percent of the cases were felt to be
preventable using the less sophisticated event monitors.
Twenty-three percent were felt to be preventable using
higher level systems. Bates later went on to implement
many of these rules during the implementation of his
physician order entry system. An evaluation of that
system over 4 years demonstrated a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion medicine-related errors and adverse drug events
[17,18]. Prior to the implementation of physician order
entry, the non-missed dose medication rate by chart
review was estimated to be 142 per 1000 patient days.
With the implementation of physician order entry, and
progressive of reﬁned rule sets, this rate fell 81% to 26.6
per 1000 patient days.
Nevertheless, the detection rate of adverse events by
computer remains challenging. Much of the attention in
identifying and preventing adverse events has focused
on medication errors because they are common and
important, but also because they are more easily iden-
tiﬁed. Non-medication errors may be equally important,
however, because those errors may point to systematic
errors that might be amenable to prevention by systems
corrections.
The challenge is that for non-medication-related er-
rors, rules are diﬃcult to identify and may depend on
the more complex narrative data. A study by Kos-
sovsky et al. [19], found that distinguishing planned
from unplanned readmissions required narrative data
from discharge summaries and concluded that natural
language processing would be necessary to separate
these cases automatically. Roos et al. [20] used claims
data from Manitoba to identify complications leading
to readmission and found reasonable predictive value,
but their similar attempts to identify whether or not a
diagnosis represented an in-hospital complication of
care based on claims data met with diﬃculties only
resolved through narrative data (discharge abstracts)
[21]. Similarly, Iezonni et al. [22] used administrative
data to screen for complications, but later reported on
the lack of completeness and accuracy of ICD9-CM
coding [23]. Honigman et al. [24] used a medical lexi-
con tool on outpatient notes to ﬁnd adverse drug
events. The results were promising but limited by lack
of full natural language understanding. A recent IOM
report stated that the automation and linking of data
on services provided to patients in ambulatory and
institutional settings would provide a rich source of
information for quality measurement and improvementpurposes [25]. This is only useful if selected documents
are reviewed or if documents can be coded automati-
cally.
In study that is described in greater detail below,
Knirsch et al. [26] used a clinical event monitor linked
to a natural language processing system to detect pa-
tients at high risk for active tuberculosis who where
placed in shared rooms. They reduced missed isolation
errors by about half. Lau [27] has reported the use of
an expert system in the detection of diagnostic errors.
An expert system (Iliad) was used to screen cases under
concurrent review by the Utah Physician Review Or-
ganization (UPRO). One hundred cases were randomly
selected from 242 identiﬁed by the UPRO as having
diagnoses recognized by Iliad. The UPRO identiﬁed 28
cases of the 100 with quality problems—mostly treat-
ment and documentation errors. The expert system
also identiﬁed 28 cases where there were potential di-
agnostic errors. These were subsequently reviewed by
the UPRO, who conﬁrmed 17 of the ﬂagged cases
(68%) as having quality problems. Importantly, six of
the cases were detected by both mechanisms, however
the problems detected in these cases were diﬀerent, and
the cases identiﬁed by the expert system appeared more
serious.3. A framework for event discovery
Discovering medical events in an electronic medical
record has several challenges [28]. Many of the data,
especially the administrative coded data, are collected
for ﬁnancial purposes and therefore may not reﬂect
clinical reality [29]. The information contained in nar-
rative reports requires natural language processing [30]
or information retrieval techniques [31] to be made
available to analysis. The data are complex with deeply
nested attributes thwarting most simple approaches to
querying databases [32]. Other challenges include: (1)
the sparseness of the data—each patient has a diﬀerent
set of reports; (2) incomplete data collection; (3) inac-
curate data collection; and (4) that many of the ﬁelds
contain categorical data with many levels (e.g., ICD-9
codes), which can be diﬃcult to handle in machine
learning programs.
As a result, querying for relevant medical events is
not a simple matter. In our patient safety research, we
are taking an iterative approach to discovering events:
1. Target events—Pick the target events of interest
(either an actual list of known errors or a conceptual
type of error to look for).
2. Repository—Begin with the full clinical repository or
a purposely deﬁned subset.
3. Natural language processing—Use natural language
processing to parse the narrative data and to create
a fully coded repository.
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rors. They may be generated manually or automati-
cally.
5. Veriﬁcation—Verify the accuracy of the detection and
classiﬁcation by manual review, thus calculating per-
formance and adding to the database of known er-
rors.
6. Error description—Use a systems approach or a cog-
nitive approach to describe the newly detected errors.
7. Feedback—Based on the errors uncovered in step 5
and the information learned in step 6, improve the
natural language processor (step 3) and the queries
(step 4), and possibly steer the next selection of target
errors (step 1).
These steps are covered in the following sections.
3.1. Target events
3.1.1. Clinically focused targets
There are several diﬀerent approaches to select target
events for detection in the electronic medical record.
One approach, which is used in most of the literature on
detecting events electronically, is to target speciﬁc events
(e.g., inpatient falls) or speciﬁc types of events (e.g., drug
interactions).
The choice of events depends on the clinical goals and
priorities of the institution. Events can be deﬁned as
important by virtue of being common (with at least a
moderate eﬀect or potential eﬀect on the patient); or of
having high impact (despite being relatively rare); or of
being particularly instructive (perhaps uncommon and
with minor eﬀect, but pointing to important system er-
rors that might help prevent other more clinically im-
portant errors). The choice of events also depends on the
types of data that are available electronically. For ex-
ample, drug interactions cannot be targeted well if
medication order entry, pharmacy, and medication list
information are absent from the electronic record.
3.1.2. Targets for calibration: mandatory reporting and
published event rates
Electronic detection of events is still not well char-
acterized. Evans et al. found that electronic detection
complements other forms of event reporting, such as
manually reported events, and that there may be little
overlap [15]. Therefore, if electronic detection will be
used operationally in an institution, it should be cali-
brated by external measures. One approach is to com-
pare the result to a manual reporting system. Some
states, for example, mandate reporting of certain events,
and institutions implement manual reporting systems. In
New York State, the NYPORTS initiative lists a set of
errors and adverse outcomes that must be reported. By
targeting those events for detection, one can use the
manually reported events to estimate the sensitivity of
the electronic detection method. The electronic methodcan then be used to augment the manual reporting
methods.
Another way to calibrate is to select events that have
been studied in similarly sized institutions [13,14,33].
One can use existing publications of automated or
manual error detection as a candidate set of events to
detect. This will allow comparison of error rates and a
gross assessment of whether the approach is uncovering
a reasonable number of events.
3.1.3. Explicit voluntary reporting in the medical record
Another approach is to look for general indicators
that an event may be present without specifying the
exact type of error. This approach can be used to dis-
cover new types of events and broaden the search cri-
teria on the more speciﬁc approaches. Although it may
not happen often, care providers occasionally document
events as being errors or adverse outcomes in the elec-
tronic medical record. That is, the provider may state
not only that there was a medical condition, but also the
fact that the condition represents an error or adverse
outcome. For example, the following sentences docu-
ment an event in an outpatient visit note: ‘‘He did not
take the antibiotics because I mistakenly prescribed
augmentin when he has a penicillin allergy. Luckily, his
pharmacist caught the error.’’
Certain phrases may be indicative of such events:
‘‘untoward,’’ ‘‘nosocomial,’’ ‘‘inadvertent,’’ ‘‘error,’’
‘‘adverse,’’ ‘‘unexpected,’’ etc. A minority of the occur-
rences of the phrases may actually represent relevant
medical events. For example, ‘‘trauma’’ is likely to
represent trauma that occurred before the medical en-
counter and which is the likely reason for the encounter
rather than a mishap during the encounter. The pre-
dictive value of ‘‘trauma’’ to detect interesting medical
events is likely to be low. Phrases like ‘‘inadvertent,’’
however, may be more fruitful. The tradeoﬀ, however, is
that terms with high predictive value tend to occur less
frequently in text. Either way, the approach requires a
manual review after the initial electronic screening to
document which instances represent events of interest.
The sample of errors found using this approach is
likely to be biased. It remains unclear at this time what
prompts providers to document occurrences as errors in
the record, but given the likely low rate of reporting, the
events found in this fashion cannot be considered a
representative sample. The approach may be useful
nevertheless to uncover new types of errors that are not
being targeted routinely today.
3.1.4. Conﬂicts in the record
Another broad-based approach is to look for cases in
which conﬂicting evidence may signify a medical event.
For example, the occurrence of a myocardial infarction
in a non-cardiac admission demonstrates an adverse
outcome and may point to an error. There are several
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mismatches of diagnoses and treatments. The generic
screening criteria of Bates et al. [34] can be seen as a
form of ﬁnding various conﬂicts in the record (trauma in
a patient not admitted for trauma, myocardial infarc-
tion after a procedure, new neurological defect, etc.).
While these are broad, they are a useful starting set to
determine if more information can be derived from the
charts (especially the narrative data) to further narrow
the search for events.
This approach can be carried out at several levels of
granularity. The most general would be to simply look
for all cases where there is any kind of conﬂict, such as a
change in primary diagnosis. This would most likely
lead to too many false positive events. The most speciﬁc
would be to look for speciﬁc conﬂicts, such as myocar-
dial infarction in an asthma patient. While this is useful
and may uncover useful events, it requires a great deal of
manual coding of rules. An intermediate solution is to
look for classes of conditions or interventions involved
in a conﬂict. For example, one could look for any car-
diac diagnosis that shows up in a non-cardiac patient.
This would catch not just myocardial infarction, but
also heart failures and arrhythmias.
3.2. Clinical data repository
Event discovery may use the full clinical repository or
a purposely deﬁned subset. In many institutions what we
generically refer to as the ‘‘repository’’ in this paper is
really a pair of databases with duplicate data: (1)
transaction-oriented repository and (2) clinical data
warehouse. For example, at Columbia-Presbyterian
Medical Center, the transaction-oriented repository [35]
serves as the basis of the online clinical information
system. It is a relational database clustered by patient
and optimized for retrieving all the data for single pa-
tients. A clinical event monitor [36] sits atop this
transaction-oriented repository and applies Arden Syn-
tax-based rules (the Health Level Seven standard for
representing health knowledge) [37,38] to clinical
transactions. The other copy of the data is contained in
the clinical data warehouse (Sybase relational database
on a Sun UNIX server), which is clustered by data type
and is optimized for cross-patient queries. This database
is well suited to retrospective exploration and is used for
clinical research and administrative support. The clinical
data warehouse are used for the retrospective analysis
and the transaction-oriented repository is used for test-
ing real time event detection.
3.3. Natural language processing
The medical record serves to document the patients
medical condition, the interventions applied to the pa-
tient, and the patients response to those interventions.Unfortunately, the portion of the medical record that is
stored in coded electronic form at most institutions—
administrative, ﬁnancial, and selected ancillary infor-
mation—is a mere shadow of the patients true state and
progress [23,39]. Narrative documents such as discharge
summaries, operative reports, progress notes, admission
notes, signout notes, consult notes, nursing notes, radi-
ology reports, pathology reports, other ancillary reports,
and outpatient notes contain a much more detailed de-
scription of the patient. Many of these documents are
captured in electronic form at health care institutions
today, but their narrative format make them inaccessible
to large scale or automated analysis.
Natural language processing [39–45] oﬀers a solution.
It converts machine-readable narrative text into a
structured form. For example, a natural language pro-
cessor might code this excerpt from a radiographic re-
port, ‘‘Improved patchy opacity in the left lower lobe,
no eﬀusions seen,’’ as follows:
ﬁnding: opacity
descriptor: patchy
body location: left lower lobe of lung
change: better
ﬁnding: pleural eﬀusion
certainty: no
This structured format allows the data to be used for
clinical research—generating and testing hypotheses with
large sample sizes and screening patients for studies on a
large scale—and for clinical care via automatically gen-
erated alerts and reminders. Natural language process-
ing can put vast stores of coded information at the
ﬁngertips of researchers. We believe that such coded
information would be invaluable to patient safety re-
search [28].
Simpler text searches that are based upon informa-
tion retrieval techniques (similar to MEDLINE or
Web-based search engines) can be a somewhat useful
alternative [24,46–48]. Rather than attempt to convert
all narrative text to coded form, these techniques look
for documents likely to contain concepts of interest. For
example, one could look for ‘‘aspiration pneumonia’’
and its lexical variants to ﬁnd patients who may have
suﬀered a complication of conscious sedation.
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that natural
language processing can achieve higher accuracy than
such search techniques [43,49,50]. Most of the diﬀerence
reported in these studies was attributable to reduced
speciﬁcity, as the search engine selected many reports in
which a condition was actually being denied (e.g., ‘‘no
evidence to suggest pneumonia or pneumothorax’’).
At least two independent groups have demonstrated
that natural language processing can be as accurate as
expert human coders for coding radiographic reports, as
well as more accurate than simple text-based methods,
such as searching for relevant phrases in the reports
[43,49,50]. Demonstration of the use of natural language
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notes and discharge summaries, is promising [44,45,51–
56]. The potential of natural language processing to
facilitate clinical research has been recognized [57,58]
and demonstrated on a stroke database of 471 patient
records [59].
There have been at least two studies on the use of
natural language processing for patient safety. One
study used a system based on a medical terminology
lexicon to ﬁnd adverse drug events in outpatient visit
notes [24]. The results were promising, but the authors
noted that limitations in the technique—it was purely
lexical rather than a full natural language understanding
system—led to many false positives. Problems included
recognizing negative terms, recognizing medical diﬀer-
entiating terms, and understanding the context within
which common pathologic conditions were being used.
The other study was part of the Applied Informatics
health information network project [60], in which a se-
ries of Arden Syntax modules were generated to esti-
mate a patients risk for active tuberculosis and sent an
alert to the hospital epidemiologist when a high risk
patient was placed in a shared hospital room. The pro-
spective study showed that the system reduced the
number of patients with active tuberculosis in shared
rooms from 13 to 7 (30 tuberculosis patients had been
placed in isolation appropriately by the physician), and
recommended re-isolation of a patient who had been
taken oﬀ isolation too soon [26]. The majority of those
patients were uncovered by natural language processing
of chest radiographic reports using the Medical Lan-
guage Extraction and Encoding System (MedLEE)
[42,61] developed at Columbia University and Queens
College, NY. This study was an example of detecting
errors in real time (patients at high risk for tuberculosis
placed in a shared room against hospital policy), fol-
lowing by electronic alerts to create a recovery (switch to
respiratory isolation).
The natural language processor may need to be
modiﬁed to accommodate text relevant to patient safety.
The form this modiﬁcation takes depends on the pro-
cessors approach. For example, MedLEE [42] uses a
lexicon to categorize words and phrases into semantic
classes and a semantic grammar to parse sentences and
create an intermediate representation that is then used
to generate a structured output. It has been found that
when moving to a new clinical area, most of the work
involves expanding the lexicon rather than modifying
the grammar (see, for example, work on head comput-
erized tomography and on discharge summaries [52,59]).
Therefore, one can exploit a patient safety ontology
(e.g., the ontology by Stetson et al., which focused on
communication errors [62]) to expand the lexicon with
minimal additional work on the grammar.
Assessing whether an error occurred (versus an averse
outcome without error, for example) may require acomplex analysis of multiple clinical variables obtained
in the report, as well as knowledge of the sequence of
events. One can exploit information such as the section
of the document (e.g., history of present illness versus
past medical history), the paragraph, the ordering of
sentences, and temporal cues from those sentences. The
temporal sequence of ﬁndings without explicit temporal
information is inferred from adjacent ﬁndings. Reﬁne-
ment of this approach to discourse analysis may be
necessary.
3.4. Generating queries to detect events
Two overall approaches to queries may be used:
manually written queries and automatically generated
queries via machine learning. Queries can be authored
by a knowledge engineer in collaboration with a clinical
expert (with expertise in the area of the target events).
The query authors study the target events, looking for
clinical cues that might alert one to the events. A subset
of the repository is chosen that is used in the process of
developing the query. When the performance of the ﬁnal
query is measured using the repository, this subset is left
out to avoid bias associated with testing on the training
set. Deﬁning the queries is then an iterative process.
Based on this analysis, an initial query will contain
inclusion and exclusion criteria over the repository. For
example, the target may be inpatients (based on regis-
tration data) who are adults (based on date of birth) and
who had an adverse drug reaction. The latter might be
based on direct mention of an allergic or adverse drug
reaction in a resident signout note, nursing note, or
discharge summary, or might be based on mention of a
symptom (e.g., rash) accompanied by a relevant medi-
cation in the signout note, discharge summary, or
pharmacy system. The various documents are linked by
the patients medical record number, the time of the
document, and for certain reports, a case number.
Based on an initial retrieval from the repository, the
authors can uncover other candidate terms to search for.
Much important information is recorded redundantly in
the record, so ﬁnding a case one way may lead to the
discovery of new cues to ﬁnd other cases. The cues may
be found in the same documents or in other documents
for the same patient. If manually reported events are
available, the records of a subset of these can be re-
viewed, also looking for cues to detect such events in the
repository. The queries can then be modiﬁed to reﬂect
the new cues and rerun on the repository. The results are
again checked in an iterative process until no further
progress is made. The ﬁnal queries are then run against
the rest of the repository and veriﬁed as described be-
low.
Querying natural language processed data can be
challenging because the information may be nested and
concepts may not always be linked. For example, when
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of skin rash thought to be allergic reaction to diuretics,’’
the skin rash and the allergic reaction to diuretics are
parsed correctly (even capturing ‘‘thought to be’’ as
being less than fully certain), but the two concepts are
not explicitly linked. If the goal were to ﬁnd allergic
reactions that speciﬁcally include a rash, then the query
author might look for the two comments in the same or
adjacent sentences. A resulting query, which also
checked the age of the patient as of the date of the skin
rash and whether the patient was currently being hos-
pitalized, might be as follows (‘‘#’’ signiﬁes a comment):
ﬁnding1 belongs to class <medication>;
and ﬁnding1.reaction¼<allergy>;
and ﬁnding2 ¼ <rash>;
and ﬁnding2.bodyloc ¼ <skin>;
and absolute_value(ﬁnding1.sid - ﬁnding2.sid) <¼ 1
# same or adjacent sentences and years (ﬁnding1.pri-
marytime - birthdate) >¼ 18;
and admission1.dischargedate >¼ ﬁnding1.primary-
time # for any admission1;
and admission1.admitdate <¼ ﬁnding1.primary-
time.
Machine learning may also play a role. It may un-
cover clinical cues to events that would not have been
thought of by expert query authors. To employ super-
vised learning, one requires a training set of known
events. This can be obtained from manual event re-
porting and from events detected and veriﬁed via man-
ually written queries. A number of techniques can be
used: decision trees, association rules, nearest neighbor,
naıve Bayes, neural networks, support vector machines,
etc. [63].
Our experience [64–68] and that of others [69] in
generating queries against the electronic medical record
has been that expert-authored queries are as good or
(usually) better than those generated by machine learn-
ing. Nevertheless, the approach can be useful to ﬁnd
new cues for event detection.
3.5. Verifying events
To assess the performance of the system, detected
events must be veriﬁed for accuracy. General deﬁni-
tions of medical error [1], recovery [70], and adverse
outcome [1] are available, but speciﬁc deﬁnitions for
error, recovery, and adverse outcome will necessarily
ﬂow from the target event. For example, if the goal of
the query is to ﬁnd cases in which a myocardial in-
farction occurred in a non-cardiac case, then the ad-
verse outcome will be myocardial infarction and its
complications, errors will be actions (or lack of action)
that could have led to the myocardial infarction, and
recovery will not be relevant as the goal in this example
is to ﬁnd an adverse outcome. If, on the other hand, the
goal is broader, such as self-reporting of medical errorsin the patient record, then error will be deﬁned as
whatever the provider was self-reporting (as long as it
ﬁts within the broad deﬁnition of medical error), and
adverse outcome and recovery will be deﬁned as being
related to that reported error. If the provider says, ‘‘I
mistakenly gave Augmentin to a penicillin allergic pa-
tient and the pharmacist caught it,’’ then the error is
the prescribing of a penicillin-containing medication to
a patient with a known allergy, the recovery is the
pharmacists catching it, and there is no actual adverse
outcome.
There are three levels of evidence available: (1) the
electronic chart; (2) the electronic and paper charts ta-
ken together; and (3) the charts and direct interviews of
the involved providers. These levels are nested, with
higher-numbered levels including all the data from the
lower levels. Automated queries are restricted to infor-
mation in the electronic chart. The levels allow one to
assess the accuracy of several approaches to event de-
tection:
• How well do automated queries perform compared to
all the evidence available (compare automated que-
ries on level 1 to human review on level 3)?
• How well can a retrospective review be expected
to perform (compare human review on level 2 to
level 3)?
• What is the maximum achievable performance of the
automated system given the available evidence (com-
pare human review on level 1 to level 3)?
• How well does an automated system perform, given
the evidence available to it (compare automated que-
ries on level 1 to human review on level 1)?
At any level, it will frequently be unknowable whe-
ther there was an actual error, a recovery, or an adverse
outcome. Therefore, reviewers can be asked to supply
information along three axes for each event report: (1)
whether it is likely that a medical error occurred, un-
likely that it occurred, or unknowable from the data,
and a brief orienting description; (2) whether it is likely
that a recovery occurred, unlikely that it occurred, or
unknowable from the data, and a brief orienting de-
scription; (3) whether it is likely that an adverse outcome
occurred, unlikely that it occurred, or unknowable from
the data, and a brief orienting description.
On a given axis, the performance of the automated
queries can be estimated given cases where the answer in
the comparison group (e.g., human review of the elec-
tronic and paper charts) is knowable. One can also
report the maximum and minimum performance, as-
suming that the answers marked as unknowable in the
comparison group would have agreed or disagreed with
the answer given by the automated queries.
One can quantify performance of the automated
queries in terms of positive predictive value, sensitivity,
and speciﬁcity in detecting an event or a property of that
event (did an error occur, did a recovery occur, etc.). In
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area and inter-rater reliability can be quantiﬁed.
One can also quantify the automated queries ability
to separate the various types of events: errors with ad-
verse outcome, near misses, errors without recovery or
harm, and adverse outcomes without error based on
reviewers coding along the three axes: was there an
error, was there a recovery, and was there an adverse
outcome.
If the approach to error detection is iterative—failures
to detect events properly are fedback to improve the
queries (and other components such as a natural lan-
guage processor)—then work on one type of target event
may aﬀect the performance on the next type of target
event. Therefore, it is important to avoid testing on the
training set. That is, the system must not be tested on the
same events that were used to improve the components
of the system, or else performance will be overestimated.
By holding back a set of events (for each target event
type) for ﬁnal testing, but iterating several rounds of
training on a single set and using cross-validation to
avoid over ﬁtting the data, one can use the data eﬃ-
ciently but end up with a rigorous measure of perfor-
mance. Cross-validation is diﬃcult to employ for
manual tasks such as knowledge engineering, but it was
used successfully for a natural language processing
evaluation [49].
3.6. Error characterization via a systems approach and a
cognitive approach
By a systems approach, we mean the characterization
of an error in the context of the health care system and
its processes, including the role that the external pro-
cedures of delivering care play in the error. One can
employ the medical error classiﬁcation scheme applied
by Kaplan, Battles, and coworkers [8,71] to the MERS-
TM medical errors reporting and analysis system, which
was used in transfusion medicine. They identiﬁed errors
by what happened, where in the process it occurred,
when it happened, and who was involved in the event.
They then applied Van der Schaafs Eindhoven Classi-
ﬁcation Model for errors [70], which categorizes the
errors as being due to system failures, including tech-
nical and organizational problems, and human errors,
including problems with knowledge-based, rule-based,
or skill-based behaviors. This approach is consistent
with the frameworks of Reason [72] and Rasmussen
[73]. Subsequently, entries in the database were exam-
ined using root cause analysis techniques.
Given a representative sample of apparent errors and,
based on manual review of the electronic record, one can
determine how much of the error classiﬁcation scheme
can be ﬁlled in using the available data. This, in turn,
can be used to estimate how much of the scheme can be
ﬁlled in automatically. There may be enough informa-tion to ﬁll in most of the identifying attributes, but ac-
curate classiﬁcation may not be possible without in
depth analysis.
In addition to partial automated coding of the errors,
one can use this analysis to improve error detection it-
self. The scheme provides a framework for searching the
electronic record in an organized fashion for informa-
tion related the errors. One can learn of new cues that
might facilitate error detection. That is, in exhaustively
searching the record for evidence of technical or orga-
nizational problems that may have contributed to the
error, one can ﬁnd cues that might not otherwise have
been thought of.
By a cognitive approach, we mean understanding
how errors occur and how a providers internal knowl-
edge of that error might be documented in the electronic
medical record. In the absence of electronic medical
records that capture data in a standardized and struc-
tured way, the only record one has to explain the basis
for a clinicians decisions is the clinical note. These in-
clude histories and physical examination (usually re-
peated in the discharge summary), progress notes
(including resident signout notes), operative reports,
consultation reports, and other text documents that are
frequently created by clinicians as they describe their
observations and record the actions that they have de-
cided to take. Some notes may not contain enough in-
formation to provide a clear basis for the decisions that
the clinicians have made. In an eﬀort to understand
problems of this sort in clinical notes, and in recognition
that text documents are still the primary record of most
decisions made in patient-care settings, one can use the
methods of cognitive analysis to gain insight into the
limitations and characteristics of dictated materials.
In particular, methods of comprehension analysis
[74–79], namely propositional analysis and semantic
networking [80–82], provide a basis for understanding
the nature of reasoning that is reﬂected in dictated notes
and for identifying gaps in logic, circularity, or non-se-
quiturs. Using such methods, one can look for any
disconnect between the actions to be taken (e.g., treat-
ment plans) and the information on which such actions
are evidently based (e.g., history, physical examination
data, and diagnostic assessments) [83,84]. Using speciﬁc
methods of scoring the summary documents, one can
study the text representation, which varies greatly
among readers depending on the prior content knowl-
edge and level of expertise. One can identify and char-
acterize the nature of inferences generated as physicians
attempt to link the content of a text to their personal
world knowledge. This gives a way to identify sources of
incorrect inferences (e.g., inferences that are based upon
ambiguous text or incomplete text information). These
documents can also be examined for the patterns of
reasoning and evaluation of evidence. The goal is to use
the results of these analyses to inform the future use of
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notes as well as the design of future electronic medical
records that are intended to capture the basis for deci-
sions so that suitable decision support can be oﬀered at
the point of care.4. Bias
Recognizing that errors are frequently not docu-
mented in the medical record, one must also assess the
bias associated with information system surveillance.
That is, what types of errors are better documented in
the electronic medical record, and what types of errors
are missing. For example, adverse drug events, an im-
portant area in patient safety research, are in fact ame-
nable to detection via information systems, whereas
others may be missing. One can compare the distribu-
tion of errors detected via this system to that of the
events reported to responsible agencies, the raw quality
assurance referral forms (with a broader range of
events), near miss reports, and large published surveys
of errors (e.g., [2,3]). One can assess the distribution with
respect to error type, type of provider involved, severity
of the outcome, service, type of visit (inpatient, outpa-
tient), and various patient characteristics.5. Extensions
Prevention and recovery are obvious extensions of
automated detection. To prevent and recover from er-
rors, the errors must be detected in a timely fashion and
the errors must be preventable or recoverable. One can
estimate the proportion of errors that would have been
preventable (e.g., [16]) and, more speciﬁcally, which
would have been preventable via automated alerts and
reminders. The latter requires (1) that the data source be
available in real time (e.g., not discharge summaries), (2)
that the error or potential error could be detected before
the adverse outcome is irreversible, and (3) that avoid-
ance or recovery could be triggered by an alert or re-
minder.
The utility of the methods in the framework for pa-
tient safety can be increased through reﬁnement of the
various steps and through improvement in natural lan-
guage processing systems. In addition, the adoption and
deployment of data standards in several areas are re-
quired to support these techniques. Use of a clinical
document architecture standard such as the Health Le-
vel 7 CDA [85] will provide additional context to nar-
rative data and consequently improve the performance
of natural language processing. Widespread implemen-
tation of the National Center for Vital and Health
Statistics-recommended core patient medical record in-
formation terminologies will increase the amount ofcoded data available for use in automated event detec-
tion [86].6. Conclusions
Electronic detection of medical events appears to be
an important and feasible avenue of patient safety re-
search. Automated event detection requires a careful
selection of target events and an assessment of what data
are available electronically. Raw data such as narrative
notes must be converted to coded form using natural
language processing or information retrieval techniques.
Detected events must be veriﬁed and they may be
characterized using a systems or cognitive approach.
Designing eﬀective queries is usually an iterative pro-
cess. Adoption of standard terminologies and a clinical
document architecture may improve performance and
generalizability.Acknowledgments
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